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MICHIGAN TITLE EXAMINATIONS AND THE 1954 RE.VE-
- NUE CODE'S NEW GENERAL LIEN PROVISIONS 
L. Hart Wright* 
T ITLE examiners, and more particularly their clients, have long suffered from a controversy-limited almost exclusively to Mich-
igan-involving the methods by which the United States Treasury 
Department could perfect general federal tax liens. The December 
1952 issue of the Michigan Law Review carried an article by the 
present writer pointing up the irreconcilable difference which has 
existed for a quarter of a century between the type of record notice 
which the Treasury was willing to provide prospective bona fide pur-
chasers et al., and the quite different and more demanding type which 
the Michigan Legislature insisted upon if the local offices of record in 
each county were to be available to the federal authorities.1 Whereas 
the Treasury has sought in many cases to file blanket notices, asserting 
a lien upon all of the property ( undescribed) of a named taxpayer, the 
Michigan Legislature has been equally adamant in insisting-with ref-
erence to liens asserted against land-that offices of record shall be 
available to the federal authorities only if the notice contains a precise 
description of the land in question.2 
The matter of the practicing attorney's dilemma in dealing with 
the above conB.ict was fully covered in the earlier article and will be 
discussed here only insofar as it is necessary in giving functionalized 
meaning to two significant events of the past year-the last being the 
recent adoption of a new lien provision in the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954. 
A Story Re-told: History of the Confl,ict 
Third party protection against federal tax liens appeared for the 
first time almost concurrently with the adoption of the modem income 
tax in 1913.3 From then until 1942, Congress provided that such a 
lien would not be valid "as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser 
or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the collec-
tor"4 in one of two ways. It was first to be filed "[i]n accordance with 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 51 MICH. L. RBv. 183 (1952). 
2Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §211.521; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) §7.751. 
s Act of March 4, ·1913, c. 166, 37 Stat. L. 1016. 
4 I.R.C. (1939), §3672, as last amended by the Revenue Act of 1939, §401. 
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the law of the State or Territory in which the property ... is situated, 
whenever the State or Territory has by law provided for the filing of 
such notice."5 Where, however, such filing had not been provided for 
by local law, the lien was to be filed "in the office of the clerk of the 
United States district court for the judicial district in which the prop-
erty subject to the lien is situated."6 
Well over forty states responded to this federal legislation by per-
mitting the collectors to file in local offices of record a notice which 
descriptively contained nothing more than the name of the taxpayer, 
his address, and the amount of taxes owing.7 Michigan then stood 
almost alone when in 1925 it added to the necessary authorization the 
special condition referred to above, namely, the requirement that the 
notice include a precise description of any land against which a lien 
was to be asserted. 8 
That the collectors' (now district directors') offices were required 
prior to 1942 to conform to this added condition if their liens were to 
withstand attack from third parties was clear enough. The federal stat-
ute itself then required a filing "in accordance with" local law, and 
permitted an alternative filing with the clerk of the federal district 
court only where the state had failed, as Michigan had not, to authorize 
use of local filing systems. 9 
However, the Treasury's dissatisfaction with this additional require-
ment led it in 1942 to induce Congress to delete from the federal 
statute that part of the statutory language which specifically authorized 
a state to spell out the added description requirement.10 One of the 
congressional committees emphasized that the amendment in question 
was intended to authorize the state "only to designate the local office 
for filing."11 
At this point the Register of Deeds of Wayne County resisted an 
attempt by the collector to file a blanket notice asserting a lien upon all 
of a named taxpayer's property. And that county officer's position was 
sustained by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Y ounghlood 
v. United States,12 the court expressing the view that by the 1942 
0 Ibid. Italics added. 
6Jhid. 
7 These statutes are cited in the earlier article by the writer, 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 183 
at 185, notes 10 through 13 (1952). 
8 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §211.521; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) §7.751. 
9 United States v. Maniaci, (D.C. Mich. 1939) 36 F. Supp. 293. 
10 Revenue Act of 1942, §505. 
11 S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 248 (1942). 
12 (6th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 912. 
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amendment Congress had not intended to test its constitutional power 
to force a state to accept for filing a notice which did not comply with 
the niceties of local law. But then the court unnecessarily went on to 
imply that the reasonableness of the state's requirements served also to 
deprive the collector of the right to file blanket notices, though unac-
ceptable to the state, with the clerk of the federal district court. 
This latter seemingly unwarranted implication was ignored after 
the Youngblood decision by the collector and by his successor, the 
district director. For several years now, every general federal tax lien 
has been filed-often in blanket form-with the clerk of the appro-
priate federal court. To complicate matters further, the director has 
continued to offer duplicate notices to the local registers of deeds in 
Michigan and, with the exception of one or two counties, these offerings 
have been accepted even though they clearly fail to satisfy that require-
ment of the Michigan statute calling for a precise description of any 
land against which a lien is to be asserted. 
The earlier article by this writer expressed three major conclusions 
as of December 1952: 
(I) Blanket notices on file in the offices of the various registers of 
deeds did not constitute constructive notice, though those offices 
did perform an unofficial service to prospective purchasers in accepting 
such offerings. The effectiveness of this "unofficial" service depended, 
of course, upon cooperation from abstract companies in reflecting such 
notices in their abstracts (some did; others did not). 
(2) The blanket notices on file with the federal district court clerks 
probably did, on the other hand, constitute constructive notice with 
reference to all property within that judicial district. It was only be-
cause of this conclusion that acceptance of duplicate notices by local 
registers was characterized above as an unofficial service to lawyers. 
Only in the event of such acceptance by the county office would there 
be any chance that a lien, covered by a valid blanket notice on file in 
the federal court clerk's office, might be reflected in an abstract. As 
every lawyer knows, most abstract companies in Michigan indicate in 
their certificate that no check has been made of matters on file in the 
federal courts. 
(3) Finally, it was proposed th·at the Michigan Legislature delete 
the added condition calling for a description of land against which a 
lien was to be asserted, for lack of federal cooperation meant that our 
legislature was probably not then accomplishing, and probably could 
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not in the future accomplish, its basic aim. Indeed, the local provision 
requiring a description had apparently served only to validate blanket 
notices covering the whole of a judicial district, and knowledge of these 
was normally acquired by prospective purchasers only in the indirect 
and unofficial way described above. 
New Developments 
A. An Opinion by the Attorney General 
The new developments which have added to the title examiner's 
problem include first an opinion in September 1953, addressed by the 
Attorney General of Michigan to the officials in Berrien County, con-
cluding that blanket notices covering federal tax liens "are not entitled 
to recordation."13 Consequently, in any county which might follow 
the lead of Berrien County, title examiners who desired to furnish any 
protection at all to their clients with reference to liens under the old 
Internal Revenue Code were able to do so only by requiring local 
abstract companies to take on the more burdensome and expensive task 
of searching the files of the clerk of the appropriate federal district court. 
One might think at first blush that the attorney general's opinion, 
rendered at this late stage, would have little practical significance, for 
it simply cited and confirmed the logic of the previously discussed 
Youngblood case. But in a practical context, the opinion could have 
rather unusual import. Almost all offices of record had ignored the 
Youngblood decision-indeed, many had not even known of it-and 
had continued to accept the blanket notices offered by the district 
director. It is not quite so likely, however, that they will long ignore 
a circulated opinion of the attorney general. This disturbing possibility 
has now been further complicated by a more recent development at the 
federal level-a matter discussed immediately below. 
B. The Impact of the Revenue Code of 1954 
Introductory note: the law. The more complicated of the new de-
velopments stems from the inclusion of two new sections in the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954. The £rst of these, section 6323(b), concerns 
substance; the second, section 785l(a)(6), involves the matter of date-
lines. The former provides that "if the notice_ filed" in an offi•ce desig-
1a Mich. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 1709 (1953). 
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nated by the state "is in such form as would be valid if filed with the 
clerk of the United States district court, ... such notice shall be valid 
notwithstanding any law of the State or Territory regarding the form 
or content of a notice of lien." 
In explaining this provision, the report of the House Ways and 
Means Committee states: 
"Subsection (b) is designed to eliminate any question as to the 
validity of the lien as against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers 
and judgment creditors, where notice thereof is filed in the office 
designated by the law of the appropriate State or Territory, even 
though the notice does not comply with other requirements of the 
law of the State or Territory as to the form or content of the notice. 
For example, the omission from the notice of lien of a description 
of the property subject to the lien would not affect the validity 
thereof, even though the law of the State or Territory requires 
that the notice of lien contain a description of the property subject 
to the lien. Subsection (b) of this section is declaratory of the 
existing procedure and in accordance with the long continued prac-
tice of the Treasury Department."14 
Enumeration of the possible interpretations. One thoroughly fa-
miliar with all of the ramifications of what we might label "The Mich-
igan Story" will recognize that the draftsman of this particular amend-
ment failed to carry out one of the most basic purposes of the new code, 
namely, "to speak clearly." 
There were two possible ways in which Congress could have at-
tempted to secure a favorable resolution from its point of view of the 
problem which had arisen in Michigan. Unfortunately, however, the 
draftsman left the direction of his main line of attack a little uncertain. 
One of the possible interpretations rests on the assumption that the 
validation, called for by the amendment, of a "notice filed" refers to 
a notice offered and accepted for filing.115 But standing alone, this in-
14 H. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., A406 (1954). Italics added. 
115 A number of jurisdictions even hold that although the official accepts an instru-
ment, subsequent purchasers will be bound only by what the records thereafter actually 
show, and a mistake in processing by the official, e.g., placing the document in the wrong 
book, will not be charged against prospective purchasers of the property. The theory is that 
the person who offered the instrument for filing is in a better position to see that proper 
recording is carried out. Admittedly, however, there is a conllict on this point, for some 
jurisdictions have concluded that the word "filed" has been satisfied in the foregoing cir-
cumstances. See 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §1273, p. 32 (1939). Nevertheless, 
even in the latter type of jurisdiction, it is one thing to say that an instrument "is filed" 
though the official who accepts it thereafter makes a mistake in processing it, and quite 
another to say that an instrument is filed by the mere physical act of depositing it in the 
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terpretation would meet only one of the two problems which have 
developed' in this state. Recall in this latter connection the fact that at 
least one register of deeds will not accept blanket notices. Even more 
important is the further fact that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, and more recently the Attorney General of Michigan, ruled 
that registers of deeds should not accept such instruments, at least in 
the absence of any statutory attempt by Congress to require our local 
oflices of record to accept such notices.16 As previously indicated, absent 
any such attempt by Congress, these rulings will have the important 
practical consequence that the one county is now likely, in time, to be 
joined by others as they become aware, particularly, o(the attorney 
general's ruling. Accordingly, if the new amendment is to provide the 
federal government with a completely favorable resolution of the prob-
lem in Michigan, it must also be interpreted so as to reflect at least 
one of two other possibilities. 
The first of these is that Congress also contemplated a constitutional 
test of power by making a frontal assault, intending to prescribe that 
every register of deeds must accept blanket notices, at least he must if 
his state, like Michigan, has gone so _far as to permit federal use of its 
offices of record in the case of other locally specified types of federal 
notices. The possibility just described would have been aimed at one 
of the specific holdings of the Youngblood case, which, as previously 
mentioned, was to the effect that Congress had not intended under the 
old code to test its power in this regard. 
A second possibility is that Congress intended only to negate cer-
tain dictum contained in the Youngblood decision. It will be recalled 
that the court there had unnecessarily, and perhaps erroneously, implied 
that a federal officer was not authorized under the old code to validate 
blanket notices by filing them with the clerk of the federal district 
court if the state had authorized local filing-and this was said to be 
so even though the only local filing permitted, as in Michigan, was 
of those notices which contained an accurate description of any land 
against which a lien was asserted. 
right office. For a recent case to the effect that the instrument must at least be received by 
the official custodian or his agent so that there will be a fair chance of proper recording, 
see In re Wagner's Estate, 182 Ore. 340, 187 P. (2d) 669 (1947). 
16 The writer does not mean to imply by this italicized statement that the attorney 
general would necessarily rule otherwise even if Congress did attempt by statute ro farce 
registers of deeds to accept such filings. 
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The primary questions of statutory construction might be sum-
marized then as follows. Did the Congress intend by the new amend-
ment: 
(1) To validate blanket notices which are in fact accepted 
for filing by local registers of deeds even though such action by 
the latter official is contrary to what was assumed to be a valid 
local law; 
(2) To require in effect that every register of deeds in this 
state must accept such blanket notices, the theory perhaps being 
that a state like Michigan which authorizes use of a local office 
with reference to other specified types of notices must allow the 
authorization to stand without the specified conditions, the latter 
being considered constitutionally ineffective; and/ or 
(3) To authorize district directors to file blanket notices 
with the clerk of the federal district court in any instance where 
a state will not permit a register of deeds to accept such. 
Most likely construction of the statute. The most likely construc-
tion of the statute would result in a finding favorable to the federal 
government with reference to the first and third of the three foregoing 
questions, the same being accompanied by a holding, in the case of 
the second question, that the Congress had not demonstrated any 
clear-cut intention here to test its constitutional power to force registers 
of deeds in Michigan to accept blanket notices. 
Some might wonder about the suggestion of a resolution favorable 
to the federal government with reference to the first question, thinking 
that a court might be constrained to feel that it was unbecoming of the 
federal government to attempt, and thus unlikely that it did intend, 
to validate blanket notices which a register of deeds has permitted to 
be filed if such action on his part was contrary to his duty under what 
was assumed to be a valid local law. Actually, however, this con-
struction conforms as closely as any other to the literal language of the 
statute and, so construed, the provision is not at all unbecoming in 
the constitutional sense. There can be little doubt that Congress has 
the power to prescribe what shall be a sufficient notice to validate a 
federal tax lien. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already said that 
Congress as a matter of power could, and once did, prescribe that such 
liens would be valid as against a bona fide purchaser though no notice 
whatever was provided.17 Recording, a fairly "late comer" in our legal 
11 United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 13 S.Ct. 846 (1893). 
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order, is not predicated on any constitutional notion of due process. 
As a purely theoretical matter, and apart from any problem of retro-
activity, the Congress has the competence to validate federal tax lien 
notices which have in fact been accepted for filing in any given place. 
A serious constitutional question and a conllict between state and 
federal power would arise only if one finds, in answer to the second 
of the three statutory-construction possibilities, that Congress in effect 
attempted here to require registers of deeds in this state to accept 
blanket notices, the same being contrary to state law. 
While there is some doubt as to whether or not th<;! Congress 
possesses such power,18 it is even more doubtful that a court would 
find that it intended to Hex its muscles in this manner on the occasion 
of the adoption of the Revenue Code of 1954. 
In this latter connection, it should be noted first that Congress 
left unchanged that provision in the code which recognizes that a 
state need not furnish a registry for the benefit of the federal tax 
authorities, and where the local registry is not made available, federal 
18 On the constitutional issue, the most proximate case is Federal Land Bank v. Cros-
land, 261 U.S. 374, 43 S.Ct. 385 (1923), upholding the right of a state to charge the 
federal government a reasonable filing fee to meet the expense of the registry system, but 
denying the right of the state to impose an added license tax of 15¢ for each $100 of the 
· indebtedness. 
The constitutional issue here might well tum on the question of whether the condition 
requiring a description bears a reasonable relation to the overall function of the state's 
registry system. Argument that it does would be based at least in part on the fact that 
the state requires as much from all of its own private residents. In this connection, the 
court in the Youngblood case had the following to say: ''We adhere to the view, plainly 
indicated in our approval of the opinion of District Judge Raymond in the Maniaci case, 
supra, that there is nothing unreasonable in the requirement of the Michigan statute that 
a lien notice shall contain a description of the property upon which the lien is claimed, 
in order to enable such lien to affect the rights of third parties; and that confusion com-
monly resulting from indices of the names of persons is avoided and reasonabfe certainty 
attained by identifying the land upon which the lien is claimed. We still think the 
District Judge correctly stated: 'Such an interpretation in no wise affects the lien as against 
any interest the delinquent taxpayer may retain in the property, places no unreasonable 
burden upon the Commissioner, involves no unusual delegation of powers to state legis-
latures, and is appropriate to remedy the injustice lhe amendatory legislation [Sec. 3746 of 
the Compiled Laws of Michigan of 1929] was designed to meet.'" Youngblood v. United 
States, (6th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 912 at 914. 
A charge that the state is engaged in unreasonable discrimination might be predicated 
on the fact that most of Michigan's own tax liens are valid without any recording whatever. 
Other cases which might be considered in connection with the constitutional issue 
are Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92,-66 S.Ct. 438 (1946); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 
51, 41 S.Ct. 16 (1920); Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 223 U.S. 
1, 32 S.Ct. 169 (1912); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717 (1879); Kentucky 
v. Dennison, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 66 (1860); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 
539 (1842); Commonwealth v. Closson, 229 Mass. 329, ll8 N.E. 653 (1918); United 
States v. Flegenheimer, (D.C. N.J. 1935) 14 F. Supp. 584. 
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district directors are still expressly authorized to file their notices with 
the clerk of the appropriate federal district court.19 One might raise 
a serious question as to whether a Congress which continued the life-
span of the provision just described would actually at the same time 
mean to assert that a state which establishes a conditional authorization 
must allow that authorization to stand without the recited conditions. 
A second and more persuasive reason for believing that a court 
will not here find any constitutional effort on the part of Congress to 
deny the right of a state to place a condition on the use of its registry 
system is attributable to the absence of precise language-in a code 
which was supposed to speak clearly-pointing in the direction of 
such an exertion of power. It is one thing to say as a purely federal 
matter that a filed notice "shall be valid [as against bona fide pur-
chasers, etc.] notwithstanding any law of the State or Territory regard-
ing the form or content of a notice of lien"20 and quite another to say, 
which Congress did not, that a state which expresses a willingness 
to accept certain specified valid federal notices must accept every type 
of notice which the federal government characterizes as valid. Even 
if the Court felt a little pressed on this issue, one would, nevertheless, 
expect it to invoke the rule which sidelines a questionable construction 
that raises a serious constitutional issue in favor of an equally attractive 
alternative construction which avoids that issue. The invocation of 
that rule would seem to be particularly compelling here, for there is 
a sensible alternative construction, and the Court might well take 
account of the fact that the draftsman of this section did, after all, 
have before him the decision of the Youngblood case, wherein the 
court had expressly said, with reference to the old code, that it would 
not assume an attempt on the part of Congress to test its questionable 
power in this regard in the absence of precise language to that effect. 
Finally, as a purely practical matter, it is unlikely that the draftsman 
would have seriously considered projecting the solution at this con-
stitutional level if only because a decision favorable to the federal 
government on that plane would still fall short of guaranteeing that 
registers of deeds in this state would actually be required to accept 
such notices. The Treasury could still be defeated on this score should 
the Michigan Supreme Court find that the whole of the local author-
ization itself should fall if the condition requiring a description fell. 
10 I.R.C. (1954), §6323(a)(l) and (2). 
20 I.R.C. (1954), §6323(b). 
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Two considerations are important here. As before noted, Congress 
continued to recognize in the new code that a state need not furnish 
a registry system to the federal tax authorities. Acting on this premise, 
the local court might then strike down the basic authorization in the 
Michigan statutes (a purely local issue) on the theory that the con-
dition requiring a description, though admittedly inserted into the basic 
authorization by an amendment, was, nevertheless, clearly constitutional 
when enacted. Since its validity would be rendered open to question 
here only as a result of an interpretation of a subsequent event, namely, 
federal legislation enacted twenty-five years after the local amendment, 
the court might well conclude that the whole should fall if the part 
does. This is the last of the reasons why one might well doubt that 
Congress would be found to have intended to launch a frontal assault 
against the state, as distinguished from prospective purchasers, etc., on 
the occasion when it adopted the new provision. 
If one accepts the suggestions heretofore made with reference to 
the first and the second possible constructions of the statute, he must 
also accept the third, which was to the effect that the district director 
was authorized to file blanket notices with the clerk of the federal 
court in any instance where a state will not permit a register of deeds 
to accept such. The only alternative would be to charge the draftsman 
with having been unaware of the fact that at least one register of 
deeds will not permit blanket notices to be filed-and that others were 
likely to follow suit eventually. And if he was aware of this fact, surely 
he would not have stopped short of solving this problem in the new 
code, particularly in view of the fact that it was the most easily accom-
plished of the problems which he faced. However, since the statutory 
words, "such notice," now clearly include blanket notices,21 it would 
seem that section 6323(a)(2) would now, in accordance with our third 
suggested construction, clearly permit the district director to validate 
those blanket notices applicable to dissenting Berrien County by filing 
them with the federal court. 22 Indeed the section referred to permits 
such filing "whenever the State or Territory has not by law designated 
an office within the State or Territory for the filing of such notice." 
(Italics added.) This language even seems to be broad enough to 
permit the district director to choose to validate all blanket notices 
21 This is the obvious effect of the language contained in the extract quoted from the 
report of the House Ways and Means Committee, p. 397 supra. 
22This writer contended in his earlier article on the subject in 51 MICH. L. REv. 
183 (1952) that validation was accomplished by such a filing even under the old code. 
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which pertain to any part of Michigan by filing them with the clerk 
of the appropriate federal district court, and this is so even with refer-
ence to notices which pertain to taxpayers residing in, or land located 
in, a county where the register of deeds is willing, contrary to local 
law, to accept such notices. This follows from the fact that Michigan 
has not ''by law" designated an office authorized to receive blanket 
notices. In fact, what is probably nothing more than careless drafting 
leaves considerable room for an argument, admittedly not conclusive, 
to the effect that two valid blanket notices could be filed with reference 
to the same tax claim against one taxpayer, one notice being filed with 
the county office where the register is willing to accept it, and one with 
the clerk of the appropriate federal district court.23 In such event, the 
sweep of each notice would depend upon the place where it is filed. 
Those filed in a county office could cover only lands located within 
that county, whereas those filed with the federal court would cover 
lands within the whole judicial district. Under such circumstances, 
one could easily imagine the government relying upon the more 
sweeping notice if it proved advantageous. Since abstract companies 
generally check only those files in the county offices, a double filing 
could then, under the construction just suggested, constitute quite a 
trap for prospective purchasers, etc. The more frequently recurring 
situations in which this might be true are analyzed in this writer's 
earlier article to which reference has already been made. 
Conclusion 
Impact on title examiners of the foregoing developments with refer-
ence to blanket notices filed after December 31, 1954. From the fore-
going discussion, it appears that the Federal Treasury has now clearly 
emerged victorious in its long-standing controversy with the Michigan 
Legislature. Unlike the situation under the old code, blanket notices 
23 Again the affirmative argument would emphasize that Michigan's failure ''by law" 
to designate a place for filing blanket notices permits the district director, pursuant to fed-
eral law, to file such with the office of the clerk of the federal court. At the same time, 
the new amendment in §6323(b) would validate the duplicate notice which the register 
of deeds did in fact accept. 
Opposing argument, to the effect that only the local filing would be valid in such case, 
would emphasize the underlying purpose of the original provision which first authorized 
the district director to resort to the office of the federal court clerk. Obviously, the purpose 
was to provide an alternative means of validation in the instance where, because of local 
law, this could not be accomplished by a local filing-a difficulty which would not be 
encountered today in view of the new federal amendment. 
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actually placed in the files of a register's office are now sufficient to 
validate federal tax liens. Secondly, the probability under the old law, 
that blanket notices filed with the federal court clerk accomplished 
a like purpose, has now been rendered much more certain under the 
new code. And finally, for the fir~t time, it is even possible that dupli-
cate _notices filed in the two different offices would both be valid, 
though the territorial coverage of each would be different-the larger 
spreading over and beyond the smaller. 
In this latter connection, title examiners should know that as of 
this date the district director continues to file such duplicate notices, 
one with the county office if that office will accept it, and the second 
with the appropriate federal court. Aside from the risk noted above 
to which this subjects the title examiner's client, he would have little 
about which to worry if he could be sure: 
(I) That his local register of deeds will continue, contrary 
to state law, to accept blanker notices for filing; and 
(2) That the federal government will continue to offer 
such notices to the local office in accordance with its prior prac-
tice. In this connection, as before stated, it appears now that the 
district director could choose in Michigan to file all of his blanket 
notices with, and only with, the clerk of the federal district court. 
That these considerations are not just of academic interest stems 
from the previously noted fact that the certificates of most abstract 
companies indicate that the abstract does not cover matters on file 
with the federal court. Accordingly, protection of prospective pur-
chasers, etc., depends equally upon continued violation of local law 
by registers. of deeds and upon their being aided and abetted in this 
practice by the district director. 
The further risk that an abstract company will not · reflect those 
filings which the register of deeds did accept, and a few did not under 
the old code, is not now in an ultimate sense borne by the prospective 
purchaser. Since those filings which are accepted by the county officer 
now validate the federal lien, the abstract company is obviously under 
an obligation to reflect the notice of lien in its abstract, absent immuni-
zation through a protective clause. 
Rather than have their clients run the two itemized risks above, to 
say nothing of the possible trap previously mentioned, title examiners 
in this state would still do well to band together in the property section 
of the State Bar Association in an effort to induce the Michigan 
Legislature to delete that part of the state's authorization which requires 
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an accurate description of any land against which a lien is asserted. 
The legislature might just as well recognize that the battle is over; it 
has been outB.anked. Continuance of the local condition requiring 
descriptions can serve no useful purpose whatever. Its deletion, on 
the other hand, would assure that all registers of deeds would accept 
blanket notices, and it would at the same time force the district director 
to use only that local office rather than be in a position to decide for 
himself, as he now can, whether to continue the practice of £.ling in 
the local office. 
A problem in retroactivity. The second relevant provision in the 
new code is contained in section 785l(a)(6)(B) and bears on the 
matter of datelines. According to it, the whole chapter bearing on 
collections, including the new lien provision, shall be applicable on 
and after January 1, 1955 "to all internal revenue taxes (whether 
imposed by this title or by the Internal Revenue Code of 1939) .... " 
This means that after the pivotal date, blanket notices which were 
placed on £.le, say in 1953, in the various county offices with reference 
to federal taxes of an earlier year now clearly constitute constructive 
notice with reference to those who become purchasers, etc., on or after 
January 1, 1955. It may also mean that blanket notices of the earlier 
period which the Wayne County Register of Deeds stamped "personal 
property only" would be validated in the context of the above example 
even with reference to land. It will even more likely mean in the 
latter instance and will certainly mean in those instances where the 
local office refused in an earlier period to accept such notices, that 
the blanket notices which the government did £.le in such cases with 
the appropriate federal district court clerk are now validated prospec-
tively, as of January 1, 1955 and with reference to land throughout 
the whole judicial district. 
These propositions will be valid, of course, only insofar as the 
blanket notices do not go back beyond the appropriate limitations 
dateline, a matter fully discussed in the earlier article by this writer.24 
With this limitation, however, it would now seem to be incumbent 
upon interested title examiners to require their abstract companies in 
such cases to check the files of the appropriate federal court clerk's 
office. Curative acts have been upheld far too many times for such 
a title examiner to rest on the assumption that this one will fail. Clients 
24 51 l\hCH. L. REv. 183 at 198 (1952). 
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also have a right to expect more from their title examiners than would 
follow from a protective clause, placed in an opinion, designed only 
to immunize the title examiner who is unwilling or too lazy to see to 
it that the federal office is checked by the abstract company. 
It would appear that we may pay a pretty stiff price in certain limited 
cases for the failure to recognize earlier, after forty-five or more other 
states had succumbed to the wishes of the Federal Treasury, that the 
Michigan Legislature was sure to lose this battle. 
